Commentary : the impact of population aging on financial markets by Adair Turner
Overall, I agree with Jim Poterba’s conclusions. But I will try to
draw out some key themes that I believe are particularly important,
and illustrate how the issues and estimates that Jim sets out need to
be reflected in the pragmatic policy considerations of the UK Pension
Commission, which I chair.
Let me begin, as Jim did, with some thoughts on the demographic
context. There are two points important to note. The first point is
that there are actually three separate demographic effects at work:
1.  A rise in life expectancy and, in particular, life expectancy at,
say, 65 years old (Chart 1);
2.  A long-term sustained fall in the birth rate, a move from above
replacement to below replacement level rates;
3. And in some countries, but not in all, a post-war baby boom—
a generation both larger in number than the one that preceded
it and from the one that followed it.
While we often talk in the developed world of the baby boom and
its retirement as the key demographic issue, it is worth noting that at
the global level and in the long term, it is the two other effects that
Adair Turner
Commentary: 
The Impact of Population 
Aging on Financial Markets
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rate have subtly different implications for public policy and for
capital markets, a point I will come back to later.
Second, regarding demography, it is important to stress the global
nature of the trends we face. Longevity is increasing everywhere
except where there is severe economic and political failure and a high
incidence of AIDS. And more surprisingly perhaps, birth rates are
falling below replacement level, irrespective of supposed deep cultural
differences, wherever we have three conditions: reasonable economic
growth, high female literacy, and contraceptives that are adequately
safe, legal, and cheap. The fertility choices made by women in
successful economies appear to be remarkably universal. Chart 2
shows Catholic Brazil, Sunni Turkey, and Shiite Iran all forecast by
the UN to go below replacement fertility rates by 2020. Table 1 illus-
trates that the biggest demographic challenges in the next 50 years
will not be in Old Europe, but will be in China, Japan, Korea, and
Singapore. For instance, in Korea the ratio of 20-64-year-olds to 65





















Cohort Life Expectancy for Men at 65
Source: UK Government Actuaries Department (GAD); 





















































Total Fertility Rates—Iran, Turkey, Brazil
1950-2020
Table 1











That is important to capital markets issues, for reasons to which
Poterba’s paper alludes. Most of our econometric or theoretical
models of demographic effects on capital markets tend to assume
closed economies. And the near equivalence between the macroeco-
nomics of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and funded pension systems—the
fact that both depend in some way on a transfer of resources from
future workers to future pensioners—is most nearly equivalent in a
closed economy. We are tempted to say: “Well, the way around the
demographic challenge is to have funded pensions invested in foreigncountries—today’s  developed world savers relying for their pensions
on output produced by tomorrow’s developing-world workers.” But
the developed world in aggregate cannot plan to meet its demo-
graphic challenge by investing in China, if China is simultaneously
planning to solve its demographic challenge by investing overseas.
The global nature of demographic change means that over the long
term our closed economy models are not as deficient as first appears.
So, there is a global phenomenon of rising longevity and falling
fertility, which, therefore, poses challenges for both state-run PAYG
systems and for funded private savings systems.
Whichever way we construct a pension system, there has to be a
transfer of resources from some category of future workers to future
pensioners. In a PAYG system, the transfer works through imposed
taxes/contributions. And if the ratio of pensioners to workers rises,
that means higher taxes or lower relative pensioner incomes. In a
funded system, future pensioners secure consumption resources by
selling accumulated assets to future savers, for example workers, and
if the next generation is smaller in number and therefore has a lower
target capital stock, that must tend to mean lower returns and/or
falling prices of capital assets. As Poterba has said, the theoretical
models, which suggest that a fall in the birth rate and thus a change
from population growth to population stability or decline must have
implications for capital markets, are theoretically compelling.
So, the crucial issue is not the theoretical direction of change but
the empirical issue of likely scale and possible timing. And for the
UK’s Pension Commission, which is charged with assessing the
adequacy of Britain’s current pension saving, that is a far from
academic issue. One analysis the commission is conducting is to
construct a model of the inputs and outputs of the British pension
system. If we are contributing 3.5 percent of GDP into pension
funds, which is about the British figure today, what percent of GDP
is likely to flow out in retirement pensions to future pensioners in
2030 or 2050, and with what implications for pensioner relative
income, given future pensioner numbers? The answer, of course, is
220 Adair Turnerpartially dependent on whether demographic factors will depress asset
returns and asset prices. 
Even absent demographic considerations, of course, predicting
future returns would be hugely problematic. There are fundamental
theoretical issues, for instance, over whether historic ex post equity
returns tell us anything even about historic ex ante return expecta-
tions, let alone about future returns. But for what they are worth,
Charts 3 and 4 set out the histograms of returns on equities and on
nominal bonds for 10-year periods during the 20th century for
Britain. But the pattern is very similar for the United States and most
other developed countries. The mean equity return is about 5-6
percent real, but there is a huge dispersion and a clear finding that the
returns for periods falling in the last 25 years have been exceptionally
high—for equities and for nominal fixed-rate bonds. Even without
the demographic factors we consider today, nobody should build a
funded pension on the assumption that the returns of the 1980s and
1990s are any guide to the future. If we use the historic record at all,
it must be the century-long record on which we focus. But should we,
in addition, assume a further negative demographic effect?
Poterba’s paper excellently sets out the empirical evidence that
helps answer that question, or rather tells us how difficult it is to
answer. The econometric results appear to be confusing. We do not
find, at a statistically significant level, the correlations between
returns and demographic factors, which theory and equilibrium
models would suggest. But some analyses of asset prices find statisti-
cally significant evidence of movements considerably larger than
theory and models suggest.
Although this is frustrating, it is what we should expect. We simply
have too few data points and too much noise.
We have only one period of fertility increase (the baby boom) and
one of decline available to be analyzed. And we have a record of equity
market returns over medium-term periods—say 10-20 years—which
is primarily determined not by a sequence of real economic develop-
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Chart 4
Real Annualized Rates of Return on UK Equities over 
10-Year Periods Since 1899
Source: Barclays Equity Gilt Study 2004
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Real Annualized Rates of Return on UK Fixed-Rate 
Government Bonds over 10-Year Periods Since 1899
Source: Barclays Equity Gilt Study 2004
Frequencyments but by changes in market expectations and confidence, by
swings of sometimes irrational exuberance and irrational despondency.
I, therefore, agree very much with Poterba’s conclusion: This is an
area of economics where empirical econometrics is inherently handi-
capped, but where the conclusions of theory are directionally robust,
and where, as Jim writes, “the theoretical models should be awarded
substantial weight.”
For the practical purposes of the pension commission, this means
simply that while we use very long-term historic average returns on
equities as our base case, we note that there is a difficult-to-quantify
potential downside from demographic factors. We note that demo-
graphic factors provide an additional reason—additional that it is to
the end of irrational exuberance—for believing that the returns of the
last 20 years are extremely unlikely to repeat. 
Plugging those assumptions into our pensions commission model,
we find that the present level of UK pension saving is going to
produce inadequate pension income and that Britain has as big a
pension problem as other European countries with similar demo-
graphics—for instance, France—but a different problem. France is
heading toward a fiscal crisis of unaffordable state promises: Britain is
heading toward increasingly inadequate pensions for many people.
But the problem is the same: fewer future workers relative to pension-
ers—unless, that is, average retirement ages increase substantially,
which surely they should. I think that a key deficiency of the studies
that Poterba has summarized—and indeed of much policy discussion
of pension issues—is that it tends to take the future ratio of workers
to pensioners as an exogenous given. Professor Poterba’s Table 1 and
my Table 1 present projections of the ratio of 20- to 64-year-olds to
65-plus-year-olds as if this were the ratio of workers to pensioners. 
But if we are living longer, and if many of the extra years are healthy
and potentially productive years—and I believe that is what the
evidence suggests—then in the design of PAYG systems, the retire-
ment age should rise, and in a funded pension system where people
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baby boomers retire asset prices will fall, then people saving in
defined contribution schemes will respond to prospectively lower
retirement income by delaying retirement, increasing the number of
years of saving, and securing higher annuity rates. 
UK Pension Commission analysis illustrates that people in defined
contribution pension schemes, on average, retire later than those in
defined benefit schemes with fixed retirement ages, and that the
retirement ages of people in defined contribution schemes are increas-
ing as annuity rates fall.
The retirement age should therefore be an endogenous rather than
exogenous variable in our models. Once we treat it as endogenous, an
interesting result emerges that illustrates two points I made earlier—
first, the need to distinguish longevity from fertility effects; second,






























Real Yields on UK Index-Linked Government Bonds
1-Year Moving Averages
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If the only demographic factor we faced were increased longevity
beyond 65, with no fall in fertility, then it is easy to illustrate—for a
PAYG scheme—that a proportional increase in the retirement age
(for example, the increase required to keep stable the percentage of
adult life spent working), would be a fully sufficient response to the
demographic challenge and that no increases in contribution rates
nor reductions in pension generosity would be required in addition
to keep the system financially sound. 
But it is also easy to illustrate the near-equivalent finding for a
funded system—that if the only demographic factor were increasingly
longevity beyond 65 and that if retirement ages rose roughly propor-
tionally in response, then for any given pensioner savings rate and any
rate of decummulation in retirement, there would be no change in
the balance of supply and demand for capital assets nor in the
capital/labor ratio and thus no reason to expect any demographic
effect on asset prices or on returns.1
Proportional rises in retirement ages are sufficient solutions to that
element of the demographic challenge that arises from increasing
longevity in both funded and unfunded systems.
The problem is that because of the decline in fertility, even propor-
tional rises in retirement ages are insufficient to offset the actual
increases in dependency ratio we face. But they should still be part of
the policy response, either via increases in retirement ages within state
PAYG or private-sector defined benefit schemes, or via shifting the
long-term average longevity risk to individuals.2 This can be achieved
through a shift to funded defined contribution schemes. But it can
also be achieved in ways that shift long-term longevity risk to individ-
uals while still absorbing investment return risk at the
scheme-provider level—as the “notional defined contribution”
element of the Swedish system does.
But that raises a wider set of issues about who should bear risks
within a pension system—investment risk as well as longevity risk.
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Chart 7
Life Company Asset Allocations: 1996-2002
Percent of Total Life Company Investment
Source: UK Office of National Statistics
(1)Majority of unit and investment trust investments 
are indirect holding of equities: small quantity of bonds also held in
this indirect route.
Source: UK Office of National Statisticsdecisions made both by individuals and by intermediaries will prob-
ably have a bigger influence on capital markets in developed countries
over the next 5-10 years than the long-term influences on overall
returns and asset prices, which Professor Poterba and I have mainly
discussed. Certainly in the UK, as my final charts show, we are seeing
a retreat of corporate pension funds from a risk intermediation role,
and a shift in their asset allocations from equities to bonds. We also
are seeing a retreat of insurance companies from an equity return-
smoothing role. Together, this implies a net reduction in classic
financial stability risks, that is, risks arising through financial interme-
diation, but an increase in risks being borne by individual
households. And we are seeing an increasing demand for index-linked
bond securities to support real indexed annuities, which is depressing
the yield on the limited supply of index-linked government bonds,
but which could be met either by changes in government funding
strategies or by the logical but until now very limited emergence of a
corporate index-linked market. I would be happy during discussion
to touch on those issues, which probably have more immediate
market importance, though they are also more specific to individual
countries and markets.
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1Note that due to a complex second-order effect to do with additional years of
return compounding, and provided the rate of return exceeds the growth rate, the
required increase in the retirement age in the funded system is very slightly less than
proportional: With a fully proportional rise in retirement age, the equilibrium solu-
tion implies a very slight fall in the savings rate.
2Note: By “long-term average longevity risk,” I mean the risks arising from the
fact that current estimates of what average life expectancy at 65 will be in, say, 30
years are highly uncertain. This risk needs to be distinguished from (i) “average
longevity risk during retirement,” that is, uncertainty about the average life
expectancy from now on of the cohort now retiring; and (ii) “specific longevity risk
during retirement,” that is, uncertainty about how long an individual will live
during retirement. Both the latter two risks can be absorbed by annuity markets, by
the state, or by private defined benefit providers, even while shifting long-term
average longevity risk to the individual.
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